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1. Introduction 
China’s industrial sector has long developed along the coastal regions of the country’s eastern 
and southern provinces. Many manufacturing firms, both local and multinational corporations 
(MNCs), have established their production bases and manufacturing hubs in these areas, 
particularly within the Pearl River Delta (PRD) and the Yangtze River Delta (YRD). The 
prosperity of the manufacturing sector has also accelerated the development of other related 
industries including shipping and port services. The ports of Hong Kong and Shenzhen in the 
PRD region and the port of Shanghai in the YRD region have clearly benefited from the 
manufacturing boom in their catchment areas. This is evidenced by the extremely high level of 
growth in the volume of traffic served by these ports in the past three decades. All three ports 
ranked among the five busiest container ports in the world in 2011. 
The economic development that has occurred since China launched its reform program in 1979, 
as well as preferential incentives from local governments, has led the PRD to becoming the 
most economically dynamic region in mainland China (Michael and Scott, 2007). The key 
growth engine has been the production and manufacturing sector. The PRD region has grown 
into one of the leading manufacturing hubs in the world for products such as electronics, 
furniture, shoes, fashion and textiles, toys, and telecommunications equipment. Many favorable 
factors have contributed to this success. The PRD region has excellent transport infrastructure, 
including ports, airports, highways, and rail systems. The logistics industry is well-developed 
and local customs services are efficient and business-friendly. The region has also attracted 
many emigrant workers from the labor-rich provinces of inland China. This has allowed the 
PRD to maintain its edge in both efficiency and cost competitiveness over other economies in 
Southeast Asia. In addition, provincial and municipal governments have offered very generous 
terms to investors, often in the forms of tax incentives and cheap land. All these factors have 
made the PRD the preferred location for manufacturers, especially those specializing in labor-
intensive products. Indeed, ports in Southern China, notably Hong Kong and Shenzhen, have 
benefited greatly from economic growth within the Pearl River Delta (PRD) region in the past 
three decades. 
However, the success experienced in the past is introducing new challenges today. Living costs 
have been rising rapidly in the PRD region, forcing manufacturing firms to constantly increase 
workers’ remuneration. Wages have surged at an annualized rate of 17% (The Boston 
Consulting Group, 2011). Preferential policies offered by local governments are gradually being 
withdrawn from labor-intensive production operations, as municipal and provincial 
governments now aim to set aside more land and subsidies for high-tech and service-oriented 
industries. The comparative advantages of the Pearl River Delta for labor-intensive 
manufacturing are fading quickly. The constant increases in labor and operational costs within 
the PRD have forced many manufacturing firms to explore alternative locations, with a notable 
focus on inland areas. Although many provinces in Western and Northern China are 
economically less developed, they have abundant labor and land resources. The Chinese 
government is thus implementing a strategic plan to promote economic re-balancing among the 
provinces in the hope they can all achieve sustainable growth in the long run and income gap 
among the regions could be narrowed (Kuijs and Wang, 2005; Li and He, 2006; Wan et al., 
2006; Qiao et al., 2008; Chen and Groeneworld, 2011). Many inland provinces and cities have 
regarded attracting relocated firms as an opportunity to catch up with or leapfrog their peers. 
Local governments and the central government have offered generous incentives including tax 
concessions, cheap land, and sometimes even free factory buildings to support investments in 
these inland provinces, thus further accelerating the relocation process. A survey conducted by 
the Hong Kong Trade Development Council (HKTDC, 2011a) reveals that many Hong Kong 
companies operating in the PRD have a positive view of the relocation option. The preferred 
location choices are areas close to Guangdong such as the provinces of Hunan, Sichuan, Hubei, 
and the district of Chongqing (HKTDC, 2011a, 2011b, 2011c). A number of high-tech 
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manufacturers have already relocated their labor-intensive assembly and OEM production units. 
For example, Chongqing has become one of the world’s major hubs for laptop computers, 
assembling about half of all units globally.  Many iPhone and iPad OEM production units are 
also being relocated to the provinces of Sichuan and Henan.  
The ongoing relocation process may pose significant challenges to the major ports in the PRD 
region, which have benefited substantially from the export and import growth driven by the 
manufacturing boom in the region. The ports of Hong Kong and Shenzhen may face some 
serious challenges if a large number of firms relocate their operations. Their hinterland access 
costs will increase, leading to reduced traffic volume. In addition, if production bases are 
relocated to provinces close to other gateway ports such as Shanghai, then a substantial volume 
of traffic may be switched to other ports. Because ports on the Yangtze River offer very 
competitive inland shipping services to a number of major cities and provinces in inland China, 
manufacturers that relocate to these areas could have lower transportation costs to Shanghai 
than to the PRD region, even if the geographic distances to the ports are similar. Traffic shifts 
can be substantial in such cases. Therefore, the relocation of manufacturing operations based in 
the PRD region will not only influence the performance of the ports of Hong Kong and 
Shenzhen, but may also reshape the competitive landscape among major port clusters in 
mainland China (e.g., as between the PRD port cluster and the YRD port cluster). 
Evaluating the effects of this relocation process comprehensively is not a straightforward 
exercise. Given that the ports of Hong Kong and Shenzhen share common transportation 
corridors and transport infrastructure to inland China, the relocation process will have some 
externality effects on the two ports’ hinterland logistics. If there is economy of scale in 
hinterland access, or a positive externality effect, sharing a common transport corridor will 
allow the two ports to lower their hinterland transportation costs. On the other hand, if there is 
substantial congestion in hinterland transport facilities, or a negative externality effect, then 
sharing a common transport corridor will increase the hinterland access costs of both ports. 
Because Hong Kong and Shenzhen provide substitutable services, an identical change in input 
costs may have different effects on the two ports.1
The effects of hinterland access on port cluster competition have also been observed in other 
markets. Notteboom (2009a) points out that hinterland access moderates the relationships 
among major European ports and has profound implications for global supply chains. Although 
there is no lack of research on the geographical evolution of ports and terminals (see, for 
instance, Ng and Gujar (2009), Ng and Cetin (2012), and Padilha and Ng (2012)) and port 
competition (see, for instance, Notteboom (2009b), and Lam and Yap (2011)) few studies have 
systematically investigated the implications of a dynamic relocation process such as that 
occurring in the PRD region. Predictions on the impacts of production base relocation on port 
cluster competition thus remain untested to date. This paper aims to address this gap in the 
literature by investigating: (a) the implications of relocation on port performance in terms of 
port throughput, hinterland access costs, port charges, and market share distribution; (b) the 
implications of relocation on port competition within a port cluster (in this context, competition 
between Hong Kong and Shenzhen in the PRD); and (c) the implications of relocation on port 
cluster competition (in this case, competition between the PRD and YRD port clusters). This 
study provides fresh insights and important policy recommendations to stakeholders in the 
Chinese port industry. In addition, the analytical framework employed here can easily be 
extended to investigate other cases in which competing ports experience major changes in 
hinterland/input costs.  
 In addition, firms may even take measures to 
increase their competitors’ costs to gain a competitive advantage (Salop and Scheffman, 1983). 
Therefore, it is difficult to gauge the overall effects of the ongoing production base relocation 
process in the PRD region without conducting a comprehensive investigation.    
                                                          
1 Fu et al. (2006) and Oum and Fu (2008) analyzed the effects of airport charge increases on competing airlines which provide 
differentiated services. In general, they concluded that an identical increase in input prices will have differential impacts on 
downstream competitive firms. 
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The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides information on the 
overall background of port competition in the PRD region and the ongoing production base 
relocation process. Section 3 describes construction of an economic model used to provide 
analytical results. Section 4 summarizes and concludes the paper. The Appendix lists a number 
of mathematical derivations.  
2. Port competition and production base relocation 
The rapid economic growth of Greater China in recent decades has led to aggressive 
investments in the port sector. Many ports have been built or expanded.  Three port clusters 
stand out along the coastal areas of mainland China: (1) the Bohai Bay port cluster, which 
includes the ports of Dalian, Qingdao, and Tianjin; (2) the YRD port cluster, in which Shanghai 
is the dominant port, followed by Ningbo and Zhoushan; and (3) the PRD port cluster, which 
has been largely dominated by Hong Kong and Shenzhen, but is complemented by follower 
ports such as Xiamen and Fuzhou. While these three port clusters compete with each other, 
competition among the ports within each cluster is even stronger. The following sub-sections 
first outline competition between and within the port clusters before providing some background 
information on the ongoing production base relocation process.  
2.1  Intra- and inter-cluster port competition 
The port of Hong Kong is strategically located in the Pearl River Delta. Supported by its high-
quality infrastructure and business-friendly regulatory environment, the port has long served as 
a major gateway for shipping and trade to mainland China and Southeast Asia. It was one of the 
first Asian ports to become containerized, and has long been one of the world’s leading ports in 
terms of shipping volume, productive efficiency, and service quality. In 1979, the Shenzhen 
Special Economic Zone was established north of Hong Kong’s border with the mainland. In the 
following years, the PRD region as a whole attracted a tremendous amount of overseas 
investment, mostly in the manufacturing sector (Lin, 1997). This led to an explosion in demand 
for shipping and port services in the region.  Given the less developed and poorly managed state 
of Shenzhen’s port, Hong Kong benefited most from this growth in demand. However, from 
1979 to 2004, Shenzhen invested over 30 billion yuan to improve its port infrastructure and 
related facilities. Restrictions on foreign investment in and management of the port sector were 
also lifted during this period, with some major terminals being privatized (Cullinane et al., 
2004). This allowed the port of Shenzhen to grow rapidly and eventually surpass Hong Kong in 
terms of traffic volume. A similar development process also took place in the port of Shanghai 
in the Yangtze River Delta. Today, these three ports are among the five busiest container ports 
in the world.  Their throughput volumes in recent years are summarized in Table 1.  
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Table 1:  Container throughput and transshipment estimates for Hong Kong, Shenzhen and Shanghai 
(2003-2009) 
Year/Port (’000 TEU) 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Hong Kong 
a 
Throughput 
b 
22,021 22,424 23,540 23,904 24,494 20,984  11,435  
Transshipment Estimate 6,661 6,817 7,062 7,171 7,348 5,141 n.a. 
Transshipment Incidence (%) 30.30 30.40 30.00 30.00 30.00 24.50 n.a. 
Average growth in port throughput (2003-2010)b
Shenzhen 
:  0.91% 
Throughput 13,562 15,899 18,171 21,117 21,416 18,105  10,354  
Transshipment Estimate 2,215 2,689 3,302 3,759 4,888 3,640 n.a. 
Transshipment Incidence (%) 16.33 16.91 18.17 17.80 22.82 20.10 n.a. 
Average growth in port throughput (2003-2010) b
Shanghai 
:  8.01% 
Throughput 
b 
14,557 18,084 21,710 26,150 27,980 25,214  13,800  
Transshipment Estimate 6,242 7,793 4,342 5,753 6,156 5,295 n.a. 
Transshipment Incidence (%) 42.90 43.10 20.00 22.00 22.00 21.00 n.a. 
Average growth in port throughput (2003-2010) b
Sources: Drewry Shipping Consultants Ltd, with supplemental data for Shenzhen compiled from the China Ports Yearbook 
:  11.88% 
Notes: a Due to data availability, container throughput statistics in 2010 were calculated from the first two quarters. 
b 
It is clear that Shenzhen experienced much faster growth than Hong Kong over the past three 
decades. The average annual growth in throughput in Hong Kong between 2003 and 2009 was a 
mere 0.38%, whereas the growth rate for Shenzhen during the same period was 10.24%. The 
port of Shanghai recorded an even higher average annual growth rate of 14.98% thanks to 
strong economic growth in the YRD region and competitive river transportation services along 
the Yangtze River. The rising power of the mainland ports, Shenzhen and Shanghai in 
particular, is changing the landscape of the port industry along China’s coastal regions. 
Transshipment operations and aggressive investments in capacity at Shenzhen pose significant 
challenges to Hong Kong, which has traditionally served as both a major gateway to China and 
a transshipment hub in the region. Although UNESCAP (2005) predicted that the port of Hong 
Kong would remain a major logistics hub for the region, it is clear that it has been persistently 
losing its market share to rising mainland ports in the PRD and YRD regions. The overall 
picture that emerges from the evidence of recent years shows clear intra- and inter-port cluster 
competition. 
Transshipment incidence figures are calculated after adjusting for estimated river traffic. 
2.2  Underlying incentives for industrial relocation from the PRD region 
Continuously rising costs in the PRD region mean the local business environment has become 
increasingly unfavorable for manufacturing firms. Liao and Chan (2011) compiled a survey 
conducted by the Chinese Manufacturers’ Association of Hong Kong (2008), suggesting the 
most influential/challenging business environment changes in the PRD region included RMB 
appreciation, inflation, and the upsurge in raw materials and, in particular, labor costs. As 
shown in Table 2, average wages in the manufacturing sector have increased sharply in all 
mainland China provinces. The average annual rate of growth in wages in Guangdong during 
the 2006 to 2010 period was 11.67%, lower than the national average of 14.45%. However, 
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because the wage level has always been higher in Guangdong than in inland provinces, wage 
differences between Guangdong and inland provinces have barely narrowed. While municipal 
governments in the PRD region are somewhat concerned about the negative effects of rising 
labor costs, priority has increasingly been given to improving residents’ living standards and 
upgrading the local economy to one relying more on high value-added manufacturing and 
service-oriented businesses. Therefore, some local governments are in favor of increasing 
salaries overall. For example, from 1 February 2012, the minimum wage in the Shenzhen 
Special Economic Zone increased by an additional 13.6%. Moreover, high fuel prices and hikes 
in power prices and electricity rates for industrial users have raised operational costs further at 
manufacturing plants across the country, especially in developed regions with their higher input 
price levels (HKTDC, 2012). The diminishing comparative advantages of the PRD region have 
put increasing pressure on manufacturers to relocate their production bases.   
Table 2:  Average wage in the manufacturing sector (unit: yuan/year) 
Regions/ 
Years 
Average wage Average wage growth (%) 
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 Ave. 
Coastal regions 
Guangdong      19785 22547 24751 27578 31277 9.80 13.96 9.78 11.42 13.41 11.67 
Fujian         15936 18391 20445 22631 26627 12.00 15.41 11.17 10.69 17.66 13.38 
Jiangsu        19117 22510 25187 27765 32209 12.87 17.75 11.89 10.24 16.01 13.75 
Shandong       15381 18477 21114 23930 27773 18.14 20.13 14.27 13.34 16.06 16.39 
Shanghai       35453 37975 43678 46672 52163 18.83 7.11 15.02 6.85 11.77 11.92 
Inner mainland China 
Chongqing      18163 21290 24249 27770 31894 16.93 17.22 13.90 14.52 14.85 15.48 
Guangxi        17104 19408 21644 23508 26179 16.94 13.47 11.52 8.61 11.36 12.38 
Jiangxi        13780 15423 17643 21508 25579 15.59 11.92 14.39 21.91 18.93 16.55 
Ningxia        15970 19461 23015 24431 29560 17.82 21.86 18.26 6.15 20.99 17.02 
Shaanxi        15955 17968 21034 23428 26015 18.87 12.62 17.06 11.38 11.04 14.20 
Sichuan        16442 18906 22090 24448 28577 15.18 14.99 16.84 10.67 16.89 14.91 
Yunnan         19131 20028 23613 23614 28550 11.45 4.69 17.90 0.00 20.90 10.99 
National Total 17966 21144 24192 26810 30916 14.02 17.69 14.42 10.82 15.32 14.45 
Source: China Statistical Yearbook 2007-2010, National Bureau of Statistics of China 
Rising costs are clearly a “push factor” for manufacturing companies operating in the PRD 
region. Furthermore, the Chinese government’s plan to achieve balanced growth across the 
country has resulted in some preferential incentives being offered to firms considering 
relocation. Such “pull factors” include incentives such as tax rebates, fast-tracked approval for 
the establishment of businesses, favorable land supply arrangements, and improved transport 
and logistics infrastructure from inland provinces to major gateway ports. The Ministry of 
Commerce has initiated plans designed to encourage investment in the central and western 
regions. The Ministry selected nine regions of central China as the first batch of areas 
designated for investment in April 2007. The second target areas were promoted in the 
following year, most in central and western parts of China as reported in Table 3 and Figure 1. 
Table 2 shows that wages in most of these designated areas are fairly competitive. Since they 
were designated as priority regions for relocation, many major manufacturing groups have 
announced plans to gradually relocate their plants from the PRD region to inland areas. For 
instance, in 2010, Flextronics expanded its production site at Ganzhou in the province of Jiangxi 
(PR Newswire, 2010; Global Supply Chain Council, 2010). Foxconn, a well-known OEM 
supplier for Apple Inc., plans to move its major production campus from Shenzhen to Langfang 
in Hebei province and to build a new plant in Zhengzhou, Henan (China Daily, 2010). In 
addition, it agreed to jointly invest in a laptop manufacturing hub in Chongqing with Hewlett-
The impacts of production base relocation on port cluster competition:  The case of the Pearl 
River Delta region. 
Homosombat, Ng and Fu 
 
6 
Packard (China Daily, 2009). Due to increasingly restrictive environmental protection policies 
along the coastal provinces, many producers of chemicals, building materials, textiles, and 
paper, are also evaluating plans to relocate to inland areas (Liao and Chan, 2011; Zhao and Yin, 
2011; Knowler, 2012). 
Table 3: Areas designated for industrial relocation in 2007 and 2008 
Region Province/Municipality 
City 
First Batch Second Batch 
Central Hubei Wuhan Yichang 
   
Xiangfan 
 
Hunan Chenzhou Yueyang 
   
Yiyang 
   
Yongzhou 
 
Henan Xinxiang Luoyang 
 
 Jiaozuo Zhengzhou 
 
Jiangxi Nanchang Yian 
 
 Ganzhou Shangrao 
 
Shanxi Taiyuan Houma processing zone 
 
Anhui Hefei Anqing 
 
 Wuhu  
Western Guangxi 
 
Nanning 
  
 
Qinzhou 
 Sichuan 
 
Chengdu 
  
 
Mianyang 
 Chongqing 
 
 
 Shaanxi 
 
Xi’an 
 Ningxia 
 
Yinchuan 
 Yunnan 
 
Kunming 
Others Hainan 
 
Haikou 
 Inner Mongolia 
 
Baotou 
 Heilongjiang 
 
Harbin 
Sources: Ministry of Commerce, People’s Republic of China and Li & Fung Research Centre (2008) 
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Figure 1:  Areas designated for industry relocation by the Ministry of Commerce (as end-2008) 
Sources: Ministry of Commerce, People’s Republic of China and Li & Fung Research Centre (2008) 
 
While many factors have had an influence on the port development, such as infrastructure 
development, inland transport condition, regulation, concentration / deconcentration, and port 
rivalry (Frankel, 1998; Robinson, 1998; Wang and Slack, 2000; Loo and Hook, 2002; Slack and 
Wang, 2002), the development of major ports in the PRD region is being significantly affected 
by the production base relocation away from the region in recent years. Together with weak 
demand following the global financial crisis that began in 2008, in the first quarter of 2011, 
container throughput of the ports of Hong Kong and Shenzhen rose only 2.4% and 3.6% 
respectively, representing a clear slowdown from past years (Shih, 2011). Although the effects 
of the global financial crisis will eventually recede, the long-term impacts of production base 
relocation will persist. Therefore, it is important that policy makers in Shenzhen and Hong Kong 
come up with long-term strategies to maintain their status as regional hub ports and gateways to 
mainland China. The following section attempts to model the performance implications of 
relocation for these two ports, thus enabling their stakeholders to formulate feasible plans for 
long-run growth.  
3. A model of hinterland access in the presence of port 
competition  
This section considers a case whereby many shippers (e.g. manufacturing companies) in the 
PRD region and nearby provinces in Southern China rely on two port clusters to provide them 
with international logistics services. Ports in Cluster 1, which include major ports in the PRD 
region, have been close to these firms, and thus provide them with almost all the shipping 
services they require. Cluster 1 has two competing ports denoted as Port 1 (Hong Kong) and 
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Port 2 (Shenzhen). The other port cluster, the Port Cluster 2 in the YRD region, currently 
provides few services to these shippers/manufacturers. However, if there is a continued trend of 
production base relocation, then in the long term, ports in this second cluster may be able to 
provide (relocated) firms with more competitive services. Port Cluster 2 comprises several ports 
including Ningbo and Shanghai. Shanghai is the clear leader among them and dominates the 
market in terms of market share and pricing capability. To take this consideration into account 
and ensure analytical tractability, the ports in this cluster are treated as a single (consolidated) 
“mega-port” denoted as Port 3. For ease of notation and discussion, the various ports involved 
in the model are referred to as Port 1 Hong Kong, Port 2 Shenzhen and Port 3 Shanghai. These 
three ports provide substitutable but differentiated services. Their demand equations are 
specified in equation (1): 
 
1 1 1 1 2 2 3 3
2 2 2 1 2 2 1 3
3 3 3 1 1 2 3 3
q q q
q q q
q q q
ρ α β γ γ
ρ α γ β γ
ρ α γ γ β
= − − −
 = − − −
 = − − −
, (1) 
which corresponds to a representative consumer maximizing a quadratic utility function of 
MqqqqqqqqqU
i i
iiii +





+++−= ∑ ∑
= =
3
1
3
1
313212321
2 222
2
1)( γγγβα , where M is numeraire 
goods (money) and q�  denotes a vector of outputs (i.e. port throughputs) at the three ports. 
Assume that a port’s price is more sensitive to its own output than to those of rival ports. That 
is, it is further assumed that i iβ γ>  for all i .  
For a (representative/average) shipper, the generalized cost of using port iρ  is the sum of 
hinterland access costs ih  and port charges ip : 
 iii ph +=ρ . (2) 
The close proximity of Port 1 Hong Kong and Port 2 Shenzhen means they share the same 
transport corridor to inland provinces.  Per unit logistics costs associated with hinterland access 
(e.g. the cost of moving a container from the production base to a PRD port) can be specified as: 
 1 (1 )i ih g d λ= + ,    2,1=i , 1 2d d> , and ( 1,1)λ ∈ − ,  (3) 
which is a function of the unit transportation cost of moving a container one kilometer for Port 
Cluster 1 (the PRD region), denoted as 1g  ; distance id  from the production base to Port i ; and 
a parameter λ  which captures the effect of the interdependence among the two ports’ 
hinterland access costs. Overall, there may be two types of countervailing factors. On the one 
hand, if the hinterland access network had spare capacity, sharing a common transport corridor 
would lead to greater utilization of related facilities such as inland terminals/dry ports, 
warehouses, IT systems, and general administration functions. This would reduce the inland 
logistics costs of both ports, in which case 0<λ . On the other hand, if the hinterland access 
network is short of capacity, then sharing a common transport corridor is likely to lead to higher 
logistics costs due to congestion, in which case 0>λ . If there is no externality at all, then 
0=λ . Suppose congestion costs are not usually as high as transportation costs themselves and 
so ( 1,1)λ ∈ − . The assumption that 1 2d d>  indicates that for a shipper in mainland China, 
Hong Kong is more distant than Shenzhen, which simply reflects the geographic locations of the 
two ports.  
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Because only one port (Shanghai) is considered in the Port 3 cluster and thus has no externality 
effect, hinterland logistics costs for Port 3 are defined as in equation (4): 
 3 3 3h g d= . (4) 
Taking into account the generalized costs of using each port as defined in (2), the demand 
system (1) can be specified as functions of ip  as in equation (5): 
 
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
2
2 3 1 1 1 1 3 2 1 3 2 1 2 2 3 1 2 3
1 2 2 2
1 2 3 1 2 3 1 1 3 2 2 3
2
3 2 1 3 1 1 1 1 3 3 2 1 2 1 1 2 3 3
2 2 2 2
1 2 3 1 2 3 1 1 3 2 2 3
2 3 1 2 1 1
3
( ) ( ) ( )
2 ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
2 ( )
( )
g d g d
q
g d g d
q
g d
q
β β γ λ β γ γ γ λ β γ γ γ
γ γ γ β β β β γ β γ β γ
β γ γ γ λ β β γ λ β γ γ γ
γ γ γ β β β β γ β γ β γ
β γ γ γ
− Ρ − − − Ρ − − − Ρ
=
+ − + +
− − Ρ − + − Ρ − − − Ρ
=
+ − + +
− − Ρ −
=
( ) ( ) 21 1 1 2 3 2 1 2 1 2 2 3
2 2 2
1 2 3 1 2 3 1 1 3 2 2 3
( ) ( )
2 ( )
g dλ β γ γ γ λ β β γ
γ γ γ β β β β γ β γ β γ






 − − Ρ − + − Ρ

+ − + +
, (5) 
where  1 1 1 1 1( )p g dαΡ = − − ; 2 2 2 1 2( )p g dαΡ = − − ; and 3 3 3 3 3( )p g dαΡ = − − . 
Assume the three ports have constant marginal operating costs ic  and follow a pattern of 
Cournot competition, the profit maximization problem of each port can be specified as: 
 ( )
iq i i i i
Max p c qπ = − , (6) 
where port charges i i ip hρ= − . The Cournot-Nash equilibrium is characterized by the first-
order condition ( )/ 0i iqπ∂ ∂ = . Solving the system of equations, the following equilibrium 
output for each port can be obtained: 
 
2
* 2 3 1 1 1 1 3 2 1 3 2 1 2 2 3 1 2 3
1 2 2 2
1 2 3 1 2 3 1 1 3 2 2 3
2
* 3 2 1 3 1 1 1 1 3 3 2 1 2 1 1 2 3 3
2 2 2 2
1 2 3 1 2 3 1 1 3 2 2 3
(4 )( ) (2 )( ) (2 )
2 4 ( )
(2 )( ) (4 )( ) (2 )
2 4 (
g d g dq
g d g dq
β β γ λ β γ γ γ λ β γ γ γ
β β β γ γ γ β γ β γ β γ
β γ γ γ λ β β γ λ β γ γ γ
β β β γ γ γ β γ β γ β γ
− Μ − − − Μ − − − Μ
=
 + − + + 
− − Μ − + − Μ − − − Μ
=
+ − + +
2
* 2 3 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 2 3 2 1 2 1 2 2 3
3 2 2 2
1 2 3 1 2 3 1 1 3 2 2 3
)
(2 )( ) (2 )( ) (4 )
2 4 ( )
g d g dq β γ γ γ λ β γ γ γ λ β β γ
β β β γ γ γ β γ β γ β γ






   

− − Μ − − − Μ − + − Μ =
  + − + + 
, (7) 
where  1 1 1 1 1( )c g dαΜ = − − ; 2 2 2 1 2( )c g dαΜ = − − ; and 3 3 3 3 3( )c g dαΜ = − − . Note 
that the condition for positive output equilibriums requires that: 
 { }3 1 2min ,λ λ λ λ< <   , (8) 
where  
2
2 3 1 1 3 2 1 3 2 2 3 1 2 3
1 2
1 1 2 3 1 2 3 2 1 3
(4 ) (2 ) (2 )
(4 ) (2 )g d d
β β γ β γ γ γ β γ γ γ
λ
β β γ β γ γ γ
− Μ − − Μ − − Μ
=
 − − − 
 ; 
2
3 2 1 3 1 1 3 3 2 1 1 2 3 3
2 2
1 1 3 2 1 3 2 1 3 3
(2 ) (4 ) (2 )
(2 ) (4 )g d d
β γ γ γ β β γ β γ γ γ
λ
β γ γ γ β β γ
− − Μ + − Μ − − Μ
=
 − − + − 
 ; and 
[ ]
2
2 3 1 2 1 1 1 2 3 2 1 2 2 3
3
1 1 2 3 1 2 2 1 1 2 3
(2 ) (2 ) (4 )
(2 ) (2 )g d d
β γ γ γ β γ γ γ β β γ
λ
β γ γ γ β γ γ γ
− − Μ − − Μ + − Μ
= −
− + −
 . 
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The output equilibriums in (7) lead to the following port charges: 
2
1 2 3 1 1 1 1 3 2 1 3 2 1 2 2 3 1 2 3*
1 1 2 2 2
1 2 3 1 2 3 1 1 3 2 2 3
2
2 3 2 1 3 1 1 1 1 3 3 2 1 2 1 1 2 3 3*
2 2
1 2 3 1 2 3
(4 )( ) (2 )( ) (2 )
2 4 ( )
(2 )( ) (4 )( ) (2 )
2 4
g d g d
p c
g d g d
p c
β β β γ λ β γ γ γ λ β γ γ γ
β β β γ γ γ β γ β γ β γ
β β γ γ γ λ β β γ λ β γ γ γ
β β β γ γ γ
 − Μ − − − Μ − − − Μ = +
 + − + + 
 − − Μ − + − Μ − − − Μ = +
+ − 2 2 21 1 3 2 2 3
2
3 2 3 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 2 3 2 1 2 1 2 2 3*
3 3 2 2 2
1 2 3 1 2 3 1 1 3 2 2 3
( )
(2 )( ) (2 )( ) (4 )
2 4 ( )
g d g d
p c
β γ β γ β γ
β β γ γ γ λ β γ γ γ λ β β γ
β β β γ γ γ β γ β γ β γ






 + +  

 − − Μ − − − Μ − + − Μ  = +  + − + +  
. (9) 
The corresponding profits can then be calculated as: 
( )
2
2
* 2 3 1 1 1 1 3 2 1 3 2 1 2 2 3 1 2 3
1 1 2 2 2
1 2 3 1 2 3 1 1 3 2 2 3
2
* 3 2 1 3 1 1 1 1 3 3 2 1 2 1 1 2 3 3
2 2 2
1 2 3 1 2 3 1 1 3
(4 )( ) (2 )( ) (2 )
2 4 ( )
(2 )( ) (4 )( ) (2 )
2 4 (
g d g d
g d g d
β β γ λ β γ γ γ λ β γ γ γ
π β
β β β γ γ γ β γ β γ β γ
β γ γ γ λ β β γ λ β γ γ γ
π β
β β β γ γ γ β γ β
 − Μ − − − Μ − − − Μ =
 + − + + 
− − Μ − + − Μ − − − Μ
=
+ − +( )
( )
2
2 2
2 2 3
2
2
* 2 3 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 2 3 2 1 2 1 2 2 3
3 3 2 2 2
1 2 3 1 2 3 1 1 3 2 2 3
)
(2 )( ) (2 )( ) (4 )
2 4 ( )
g d g d
γ β γ
β γ γ γ λ β γ γ γ λ β β γ
π β
β β β γ γ γ β γ β γ β γ




      +  

  − − Μ − − − Μ − + − Μ  =
 + − + +  
. (10) 
The above equilibrium results enable the study to analyze the overall effects of production base 
relocation, possible externalities affecting hinterland access, and unit transportation costs by 
investigating comparative statics. The detailed derivations are summarized below. 
3.1 The effect of industrial relocation ( id ) 
If many manufacturing firms relocate their production base away from the PRD region, the 
distances to all ports will change. As shown in Appendix, the following analytical results can be 
obtained with respect to the distance changes: 
The effects of a change in distance on the port’s own performance:  
 
*
0i
i
q
d
∂
<
∂
, 
*
0i
i
p
d
∂
<
∂
, and 
*
0i
id
π∂
<
∂
,     where 3,..,1=i  (11) 
The effects of a change in distance on rival ports’ performance: 
 
*
0i
j
q
d
∂
>
∂
, 
*
0i
j
p
d
∂
>
∂
, and 
*
0i
jd
π∂
>
∂
,    where  3,..,1, =ji , ji ≠  (12) 
The interpretation of these results is straightforward. As shippers (i.e. users of port services) 
move away from a port, the port’s performance will suffer in terms of lower port throughput, 
reduced port service charges, and declining profitability. This will benefit its rival ports, which 
experience increasing output, a lift in revenue from port service charges and higher profits. That 
is, both Shenzhen and Hong Kong will suffer when manufacturing firms relocate away from the 
PRD region. However, Shanghai may benefit from such a pattern, as some relocated shippers 
could use Shanghai as a substitute gateway.    
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3.2 The effect of externalities on hinterland access costs 
As explained above, there may be either positive and negative externality effects in hinterland 
access, as measured by the parameter λ . With the equilibrium outcomes characterized by 
equations (7), (9), and (10), it can be derived that: 
For Hong Kong: 
 
*
1 0q
λ
∂
<
∂
, 
*
1 0p
λ
∂
<
∂
, and 
*
1 0π
λ
∂
<
∂
 (13) 
For Shenzhen: 
  
*
2 0q
λ
∂
≥
∂
, 
*
2p
λ
∂
≥
∂
, and 
*
2π
λ
∂
≥
∂
 when 3 2 1 31 2 12
1 3 3
21
4
d d dβ γ γ γ
β β γ
 −
− ≥ − − 
; (14.1) 
 
*
2 0q
λ
∂
<
∂
, 
*
2 0p
λ
∂
<
∂
, and 
*
2 0π
λ
∂
<
∂
 when 3 2 1 31 2 12
1 3 3
21
4
d d dβ γ γ γ
β β γ
 −
− < − − 
 (14.2) 
For Shanghai: 
 
*
3 0q
λ
∂
>
∂
, 
*
3 0p
λ
∂
>
∂
, and 
*
3 0π
λ
∂
>
∂
 (15) 
The implications for the ports of Hong Kong and Shanghai are clear. For Hong Kong, when 
there are increasing positive externalities (or decreasing negative externalities when λ  is 
falling), such as stronger density effects leading to lowered hinterland access costs or reduced 
congestion in the shared hinterland transport corridor, traffic volume and port service charges at 
Hong Kong will increase, leading to higher profit. This will be bad news for the competing port 
of Shanghai, where performance will decrease as it now faces a more competitive rival port.  
The implications for Shenzhen (Port 2 in our model) are more complex. When hinterland access 
is improved, two countervailing factors will influence the performance of Shenzhen. On the one 
hand, improved hinterland access will benefit Shenzhen by reducing hinterland logistics costs 
and thus the generalized costs of using Shenzhen. On the other hand, because Hong Kong and 
Shenzhen share a hinterland corridor, improved hinterland access also implies that Hong Kong 
will be more competitive. Therefore, the net effect on Shenzhen will depend on the relative size 
of these two effects. When hinterland access costs for Hong Kong are much larger than those 
for Shenzhen (in the sense that 3 2 1 31 2 12
1 3 3
21
4
d d dβ γ γ γ
β β γ
 −
− ≥ − − 
), improved hinterland access 
will benefit Hong Kong much more than it will benefit Shenzhen. In such a case, the negative 
competitive effect on Shenzhen will outweigh the positive effect of cost savings. As a result, 
Shenzhen will suffer overall from an improvement in hinterland access. Otherwise, if there is 
not much difference in the costs of hinterland access for Hong Kong and Shenzhen, then both 
ports will benefit from improved hinterland transport.  
The ports of Shenzhen and Hong Kong are very close to each other geographically. This appears 
to suggest that 1 2d d−  is small, and thus 
*
2( / ) 0q λ∂ ∂ <  is likely to hold. In reality, however, 
there may be significant costs associated with delivering goods from inland provinces to Hong 
Kong, which has separate customs and operating regulations. In addition to costs associated 
with security checks and customs clearance, mainland Chinese drivers are prohibited from 
driving container trucks directly to port terminals in Hong Kong. Hong Kong drivers who get 
paid much more than their mainland counterparts are required to take over driving such trucks at 
the border. These special arrangements could make the hinterland access costs of Hong Kong 
much higher than those of Shenzhen. This is not a new finding: a survey conducted by the 
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Better Hong Kong Foundation (2004) shows that Hong Kong has lost competitiveness in 
comparison with Shenzhen due to higher transport costs for containers crossing the border. 
Trucking costs could increase substantially as a consequence of higher operating costs (parking, 
insurance and maintenance costs), cross-boundary regulation (costs associated with cross-
boundary licenses and switching of drivers), and the low frequency of trips (McKinnon, 2011). 
The new finding in our model produced is that the cost of crossing the border to Hong Kong 
will influence Shenzhen’s attitude toward cooperation on hinterland access. If cross-border costs 
are so high that Hong Kong has much higher overall hinterland access costs than Shenzhen (in 
the sense that 3 2 1 31 2 12
1 3 3
21
4
d d dβ γ γ γ
β β γ
 −
− ≥ − − 
 in our model), then Shenzhen will have no 
interest in working with Hong Kong to improve hinterland access. It will prefer to keep Hong 
Kong at a disadvantage due to its inconvenient hinterland access. However, if hinterland access 
costs to Hong Kong and Shenzhen are similar, then both ports will benefit from cooperating on 
such access. Therefore, they will have greater incentives to share their facilities and pool 
capacity (such as by sharing warehouses, dry port terminals, trucking services, and IT systems). 
Given the hard work carried out by the Hong Kong government and the port of Hong Kong to 
streamline cross-border cargo flows, it is likely that hinterland access costs for Shenzhen and 
Hong Kong are now close to each other. That is, the condition 3 2 1 31 2 12
1 3 3
21
4
d d dβ γ γ γ
β β γ
 −
− < − − 
 
is in reality likely to hold in the current market. Of course, more detailed empirical analysis is 
needed to confirm this intuition. 
3.3 The effects of ground transportation costs  
Hinterland access costs may change due to many factors such as the availability of new 
transport facilities (e.g. the availability of good rail transport services and the building of new 
highways), market structure changes in the logistics sector, or simply fluctuations in fuel prices. 
Some of these factors will lead to a general increase/decrease in the transportation costs 
associated with all three ports. In other cases, not all ports will be affected. The next analysis is 
to examine changes in the unit transportation costs of Port Cluster 1 (i.e. changes in parameter 
1g  for Hong Kong and Shenzhen), as well as possible changes associated with transportation 
costs of the other cluster (i.e. transportation cost for Shanghai 3g ). It can be shown that: 
Effects on Hong Kong: 
 
*
1
1
0q
g
∂
<
∂
, 
*
1
1
0p
g
∂
<
∂
, and 
*
1
1
0
g
π∂
<
∂
; and 
*
1
3
0q
g
∂
>
∂
, 
*
1
3
0p
g
∂
>
∂
, and 
*
1
3
0
g
π∂
>
∂
 (16) 
Effects on Shenzhen  
 
*
2
1
0q
g
∂
≥
∂
, 
*
2
1
0p
g
∂
≥
∂
, and 
*
2
1
0
g
π∂
≥
∂
 when 3 2 1 31 2 12
1 3 3
21
4
d d dβ γ γ γ
β β γ
 −
− ≥ − − 
; (17.1) 
 
*
2
1
0q
g
∂
<
∂
, 
*
2
1
0p
g
∂
<
∂
, and 
*
2
1
0
g
π∂
<
∂
 when 3 2 1 31 2 12
1 3 3
21
4
d d dβ γ γ γ
β β γ
 −
− < − − 
;  (17.2) 
  
*
2
3
0q
g
∂
>
∂
, 
*
2
3
0p
g
∂
>
∂
, and 
*
2
3
0
g
π∂
>
∂
 (17.3) 
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Effects on Shanghai: 
 
*
3
1
0q
g
∂
>
∂
, 
*
3
1
0p
g
∂
>
∂
, and 
*
3
1
0
g
π∂
>
∂
; 
*
3
3
0q
g
∂
<
∂
, 
*
3
3
0p
g
∂
<
∂
, and 
*
3
3
0
g
π∂
<
∂
 (18) 
As evidenced by 
*
1
3
0
g
π∂
>
∂
, 
*
2
3
0
g
π∂
>
∂
, and 
*
3
1
0
g
π∂
>
∂
,  an increase in transportation costs at 
competing ports will always be good news.  However, the effects of a rise in a port’s own 
transportation costs may be complicated. For Hong Kong and Shanghai, rising transportation 
costs will always reduce their own performance in terms of traffic volume, port service charges, 
and operating profit. However, the situation may be more complicated in Shenzhen. Again, this 
is due to the fact that because Shenzhen is close to Hong Kong and they share a common 
transport corridor, a rise in transportation costs will have two implications: on the one hand, it 
will increase the general costs of using Shenzhen; on the other hand, as suggested by Salop and 
Scheffman (1983), a firm may benefit from an increase in input prices if it harms its competitors 
more. Therefore, if transport costs are significantly lower in Shenzhen than they are in Hong 
Kong, then a rise in transportation costs could benefit Shenzhen. Again, this shows the 
importance of cross-boundary costs for the port of Shenzhen. Given the hard work conducted by 
the Hong Kong government and the port of Hong Kong to streamline cross-border cargo flows 
referred to earlier, it is likely that Shenzhen and Hong Kong now have similar hinterland access 
costs. Thus, both Shenzhen and Hong Kong have an incentive to work together to reduce their 
hinterland access costs. 
4. Summary and conclusion 
Southern Chinese ports, notably Hong Kong and Shenzhen, have benefited greatly from 
economic growth within the Pearl River Delta (PRD) region in the past three decades. However, 
in recent years, constant increases in labor and operational costs within the PRD region have 
forced many manufacturing firms to relocate further inland. At the same time, many provinces 
in Western and Northern China are economically less developed, but have abundant labor and 
land resources. The Chinese government is implementing a strategic plan to promote an 
economic rebalancing among the provinces in the hope they all achieve sustainable growth in 
the long run. This has triggered an ongoing process of relocation for many firms in the PRD 
region. Given the presence of significant intra- and inter-cluster competition in the Chinese port 
industry, this relocation process will not only affect the ports of Shenzhen and Hong Kong, but 
will also have an impact on ports in other clusters. Although previous studies have analyzed the 
implications of hinterland access, few have investigated the dynamic effects of production base 
relocation.  
To fill this gap in the literature, this study develops an analytical framework to examine the 
effects of the ongoing trend of production base relocation. Among the novel features of this 
model are that it explicitly considers both intra- and inter-port cluster competition, and the 
possible (positive or negative) effects of externalities on port hinterland access. These features 
are important given that Hong Kong and Shenzhen share a transportation corridor to China’s 
inland provinces. Hinterland access may be affected by economies of traffic density (i.e. a 
positive externality) or congestion effects (i.e. a negative externality).  Our analytical results 
suggest that when production bases in the PRD region are moved further inland, an increase in 
hinterland access costs will reduce the overall performance of Hong Kong in terms of lower 
throughput, reduced port charges revenue, and a smaller operating profit. In contrast, the port of 
Shanghai will benefit from such externalities due to the increased incentives for some traffic to 
be shifted. In theory, the port of Shenzhen, which shares a transport corridor to inland provinces 
with Hong Kong, may either benefit or suffer from an increase in hinterland access costs. On the 
one hand, it will suffer from an increase in the total cost of using the port. On the other hand, an 
increase in transportation costs may do greater harm to Hong Kong and thus help Shenzhen gain 
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a competitive advantage over its neighbor – an intuition similar to the well-known strategy of 
“raising rivals’ costs”. Therefore, Shenzhen will have an incentive to work with Hong Kong to 
improve their hinterland access only if Hong Kong has a good network connecting it to 
mainland China. That is, good cross-border infrastructure will facilitate cooperation between 
Shenzhen and Hong Kong. Given that the Hong Kong government and the port of Hong Kong 
have worked hard to improve cross-border cargo flows in recent years, it is likely that in the 
current market, both Shenzhen and Hong Kong have incentives to work together to address the 
ongoing production base relocation problem. While a detailed empirical investigation should be 
carried out to verify this conclusion for the PRD region, the general theoretical implication is 
clear: a more competitive port will be in a better position to cooperate with other stakeholders. 
This study provides a number of valuable academic and practical insights. Southern China is a 
pioneering showpiece for the transformation of regional port governance within a rapidly 
developing economy where institutional frameworks are highly diversified. This study provides 
useful insights enabling decision-makers to develop pragmatic and sustainable regional 
governance policies for the future well-being of the PRD region. Given the key role played by 
ports as key nodal points of supply chains where different stakeholders interact, this paper 
contributes to the development of a fully-integrated regional port system within the PRD in 
particular and among gateway-hinterland regions in general. This paper has addressed the 
urgent need in re-establishing focus on the dynamics between ports and regional development. It 
is important to understand such dynamics between ports and regional development, and thus 
there is a need to formulate integrated and sustainable port and maritime logistical systems to 
improve the well-being and development of different geographical regions.  
While this paper focuses on the PRD region, it is strongly believed that the analytical 
framework developed in this study can be easily extended to investigate other cases when 
competing ports experiences major changes in hinterland access costs. Although this study 
provides several constructive policy recommendations, there remain some areas needed for 
future research. The most important issue may be the empirical investigation in order to confirm 
the analytical findings in this paper. A comprehensive survey of the relocating manufacturers 
(i.e. new location and shipping volume) is also needed, so that the impact of the relocation 
process on major ports in the PRD region can be empirically measured. Despite intense 
competition within the port cluster in the PRD, the ports of Hong Kong and Shenzhen should 
cooperate in some operational issues, for example, the hinterland access improvement.  
However, since the institutional frameworks in these two areas are highly diversified, there is a 
need to take these factors into consideration to ensure the feasibility of such cooperation. 
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Appendix analytical derivations and results on market 
equilibriums 
A1. With respect to λ : 
For Hong Kong (or Port 1) 
*
1
1 1 0
q g
λ
∂
= − Σ <
∂
, 
*
1
1 1 1 0
p gβ
λ
∂
= − Σ <
∂
, and 
*
*1
1 1 1 12 0g q
π
β
λ
∂
= − Σ <
∂
, 
where  
2
1 2 3 1 2 3 2 1 3
1 2 2 2
1 2 3 1 2 3 1 1 3 2 2 3
(4 ) (2 ) 0
2 4 ( )
d dβ β γ β γ γ γ
β β β γ γ γ β γ β γ β γ
− − −
Σ = >
 + − + + 
 
For Shenzhen (or Port 2) 
*
2
1 2
q g
λ
∂
= − Σ
∂
, 
*
2
2 1 2
p gβ
λ
∂
= − Σ
∂
, and 
*
*2
2 1 2 22 g q
π
β
λ
∂
= − Σ
∂
, 
where  
2
1 3 2 1 3 2 1 3 3
2 2 2 2
1 2 3 1 2 3 1 1 3 2 2 3
(2 ) (4 )
2 4 ( )
d dβ γ γ γ β β γ
β β β γ γ γ β γ β γ β γ
− − + −
Σ =
 + − + + 
, and the above expressions will 
be: 
(1) positive when 3 2 1 32 12
1 3 3
(2 )
(4 )
d dβ γ γ γ
β β γ
−
≤
−
 or 3 2 1 31 2 12
1 3 3
21
4
d d dβ γ γ γ
β β γ
 −
− ≥ − − 
; and 
(2) negative when 3 2 1 32 12
1 3 3
(2 )
(4 )
d dβ γ γ γ
β β γ
−
>
−
 or 3 2 1 31 2 12
1 3 3
21
4
d d dβ γ γ γ
β β γ
 −
− < − − 
 
For Shanghai (or Port 3) 
*
3
1 3 0
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λ
∂
= Σ >
∂
, 
*
3
3 1 3 0
p gβ
λ
∂
= Σ >
∂
, and 
*
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3 1 3 3 0g q
π
β
λ
∂
= Σ >
∂
, 
where  1 2 3 1 2 2 1 1 2 33 2 2 2
1 2 3 1 2 3 1 1 3 2 2 3
(2 ) (2 ) 0
2 4 ( )
d dβ γ γ γ β γ γ γ
β β β γ γ γ β γ β γ β γ
− + −
Σ = >
 + − + + 
 
A2. With respect to id : 
For Hong Kong (or Port 1) 
*
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1 11
1
(1 ) 0q g
d
λ
∂
= − + Ε <
∂
, 
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1
1 1 11
1
(1 ) 0p g
d
β λ
∂
= − + Ε <
∂
, and 
*
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1 1 1 11
1
2 (1 ) 0g q
d
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β λ
∂
= − + Ε <
∂
; 
*
1
1 12
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∂
, 
*
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β λ
∂
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∂
, and 
*
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2
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= + Ε >
∂
; 
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3 13
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0q g
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∂
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1 3 13
3
0p g
d
β
∂
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∂
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3
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∂
; 
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where  
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2 3 1
11 2 2 2
1 2 3 1 2 3 1 1 3 2 2 3
(4 ) 0
2 4 ( )
β β γ
β β β γ γ γ β γ β γ β γ
−
Ε = >
 + − + + 
, 
 3 2 1 312 2 2 2
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For Shenzhen (or Port 2) 
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A3. With respect to ig : 
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